This paper suggests that the empirical measurement of market structure, particularly the reliance on concentration indexes as an indicator of noncompetitive market power, does not adequately reflect recent advances in theory. This paper integrates the literature of the interaction between market structure and firm behavior with dynamic measures of structure. Our estimation for the savings and loan industry suggests that continued application of traditional static measures in market structure-performance studies are apt to be misleading. We call for more investigation into measures of dynamic structure.
I. Introduction
While market structure affects market performance, empirical studies have not always found a relationship between indicators of performance (e.g., profitability) and market structure, as represented by indexes of concentration. I Yet such indexes playa prominent role in antitrust regulation. Antitrust policy, then, faces two problems: doubt as to whether concentrated industries actually perform poorly, and a lack of criteria for choosing from among alternative indexes.
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One reason for these problems is that empirical measures of market structure, especially indexes of concentration, have not kept up with the theory of industrial organization. While recent studies emphasize the dynamic evolution of markets as the. key to predicting firm behavior and market outcomes, empirical measures of concentration typically focus on static market structure at one point in time.
While empirical research can incorporate some of these dynamic elements in an ad hoc way, regulation concerning mergers and acquisitions tends to rely on simple, standardized indicators of concentration. We argue that such indicators may have misleading implications for public policy.
Using the savings and loan industry as an example, this paper seeks to integrate the literature of the interaction between market structure and firm behavior with dynamic measures of market structure. Section II summarizes the literature on traditional measures of structure, and Section III discusses previously-used measures of dynamic structure. Section IV presents first approximations of dynamic measures of market structure. Results of estimations of the market structure-profitability relation with both static and dynamic structure measures are in Section V. Section VI closes with public policy implications and recommendations for future research.
II. Traditional Measures of Concentration and Market Structure
In seeking to tie industrial performance to market structure, early work with simple-sum concentration ratios led to full-distribution measures-notably the entropy, Hirschman Herfindahl and Hall-Tideman indexes. Indeed, the Justice Department adopted the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index as the "official" measure of concentration on the grounds that its consideration of all firms and disproportional weighting of large-share firms "probably accords with their relative importance in any collusive interaction." (U.S. Department of Justice 1982, p. 17) The Justice Department's merger guidelines establish fixed cut-off values of 1000 and 1800 with industries below or above these values respectively classified as "unconcentrated" and "highly concentrated." Recent clarification of Justice Department policy has strengthened the use of the 1800 cut off value of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index in the evaluation of bank mergers and acquisitions.
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Despite this use of concentration indexes in regulatory policy, studies of the relationship between structure and performance have not found a consistent relationship between performance and concentration. In financial markets, a survey by Heggestad (1979) concludes that "The concentration-profitability relationship in banking has been found to be quite weak, which is surprising, since many studies find that price and non-price competition is affected by concentration." Evidence for the traditional hypothesis of a direct relation between concentration and profitability may be found in Edwards (1965) , Kaufman (1966) , Heggestad (1977) . Contrasting evidence is presented in Bryan (1972) , Ware (1972), and Yeats (1974) .
One possible reason for the lack of a strong empirical relationship between concentration and profitability is that the indexes used to measure market structure may fail to capture the dynamic evolution of a market. In "creative destruction," (Schumpeter 1950; Nelson and Winter 1982) , the process whereby innovators challenge the market power of dominant firms depends not so much on a dominant firm's share, but on how fast that share is eroded. The emphasis on entry barriers in Bain (1956) views market power as a function of the ability to maintain noncompetitive structure over time. One implication of the empirical literature on entry barriers is that a snapshot picture of different markets at one point in time may be able to explain entry as a function of barriers, yet there may be no simple relation between performance measures (e.g., profitability) and existing static market structure. For example, a concentrated market may exhibit high or low profitability depending upon whether or not its members have had to allocate resources to resist entry efforts.
The importance of changes in market structure is strengthened by the findings of Shepherd (1979) and others who find that profitability of individual firms is more a function of their own market than the average characteristics of the market as a whole. 4 The importance of firm shares also implies that changes in relative position are crucial in determining performance. 5 Emphasis on the individual firm's position in the market has fostered research on the relation between intra-market strategic group concentration and performance. 6 That is, behavior depends both on average concentration, and the degree to which smaller "outgroup" members can challenge the members of the dominant oligopoly core. 7 The "uprising" theory of contestable markets in Baumol (1982) argues that free entry and exit are the prime determinants of contestability. Actual and potential entrants, not the lack of concentration in market shares, discipline incumbents. Among financial institutions, an existing firm may suddenly change behavior and act like one of Merger with another firm, acquisition by a holding company, or a sudden shift in management can lead a small firm to challenge the position of the dominant oligopoly core.
In the same vein, Brozen's (1982) survey of concentration and performance attacks the "naive" notion that the number of firms or the distribution of market shares has consistent effect on the performance of an industry. Brozen (1982) argues that social costs and benefits of concentration can be evaluated only by tracing the evolution of market performance over time.
III. Dynamic Measures of Concentration
Despite the theoretical emphasis on evolution over time as the key to performance and scattered calls for dynamic measures of market structure, there has been little empirical work to operationalize the approach. 9 In financial markets, a few papers have examined empirical relations between changes in measures of market structure and performance. Graddy (1980) finds that, regardless of initial levels of structure, changes in deposit shares of dominant firms are important determinants of performance. Marlow (1983a) finds that increases in both de novo and branching entry by commercial banks and savings and loans improve performance. More important in terms of measuring concentration, Rose and Fraser (1976) find no evidence of a relation between performance and changes in simple-sum concentration, Herfindahl, or share stability indexes.
Simply measuring the net change in existing static indexes is unlikely to capture the key evolutionary aspects of market structure. An index which seeks to summarize the degree of anticompetitive potential should reflect dynamic aspects. An adequate measure should represent the degree of active competition among firms for top positions in a market. While competition may be affected by the size of market share held by the largest firms, the potential for movement in and out of the top positions is of primary importance to competitive behavior. Such indicators of competitive structure are "dynamic," as opposed to comparative-static indexes of concentration. 10
IV. First Approximations of Dynamic Structure
We consider two dynamic measures of structure: mobility and turnover over specified time periods. These measures are dynamic, in that different positionings or orderings of competitors over time are associated with different levels of competition. The following definitions (with respect to deposit volume) are used. II Mobility (M) is the number of changes in rank that occur among the three largest finns in a SMSA. Turnover (T) measures the number of times that finns below the top three move into the top three in a SMSA.
We argue that a large change in the rank ordering of firms reflects a high level of competition that ultimately reduces profitability. This argument implies one-way casuality which runs from our measures of competitive structure to profitability. Whether or not such confrontations over market share result from declining or increasing total market strength. the actions of aggressive management in a stable market or just basic instinctive behavior really do not affect the argument. The important issue is that challenges to the dominant firms are crucial to the measurement of competition.
There are two potential problems with our measurement of market power. Similar measures of mobility and turnover have been applied in market structure-performance studies of financial markets. However, they have always been employed as performance (dependent) variables. 12 Heggestad and Rhoades (1976) , Rhoades (1980) , and Rhoades and Rutz (1981) use data for commercial banks, while Marlow (1983b) and Marlow, Link and Trost (1984) use data for savings and loans. While mobility and turnover are inversely correlated with profitability (Marlow 1983b) , the question of whether these variables are endogenous or exogenous has not been specifically addressed in the literature. However, since conventional microeconomics argues that competition affects profitability, it seems reasonable to assume that our dynamic measures of competitiveness are exogenous determinants of profitability.
Causality from profitability to dynamic structure measures would imply that our structure measures are endogenous. For example, finns operating with low profits could reduce their operating size, thus affecting the magnitude of our measures of structure. We cannot dismiss the possibility that causality could run both ways. 13 However, this issue is equallty pertinent to the modeling of traditional relations between performance and market structure. Placing our measures on the right-hand side of the equation does not prove that they are exogenou.,. However, antitrust regulation assumes that high levels of concentration cause noncompetitive behavior. Exploration of a simultaneous determination of market structure is left for future research.
V. Estimation of Market Structure-Profitability Relations
The empirical model, which is estimated by a linear regression model with 124 observations, is OPEX, LIQ, PCY, PP, CBP, Dl, D2) (1) II We have also used five firms, in place of three, as the cut off number for these definitions but this does not alter the results below.
12 Studies using mobility and turnover measures in nonfinancial markets include Kaplan (1954) , Friedland (957), Hymer and Pashigian (1962) , and Boyle and Sorenson (1971) . However, due to limited availability of rnicrodata, they tend to estimate market structure-performance relations for large groupings of industries.
IJ One may be able to describe circumstances that suggest opposite causality from the direction assumed here. For example, those SMSAs with relatively low profits may represent SMSAs where exogenous shocks have hit large firms that represent large numbers in the market profit data. In this case, it is possible that their depressed profits lower the market figure and, consequently, this exogenous profit shock would produce negative signs on the coefficients on mobility and turnover. SMSAs over the period 1976-1979. 17 The choice of the 124 SMSAs is based solely on data availability and the criterion that each SMSA has more than five savings and loans in 1979.
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A cut-off of three finns is necessary due to the definition of T: with less than four firms, T must always be zero. Therefore, for SMSAs with less than four finns, the value of T =°does not provide a measure of economic significance. 19 The reduced-fonn of Equation (I) is chosen since it is consistent with previous studies and provides estimation of the net effects of explanatory variables on profitability. 20 14 An alternative measure of profitability (net income/total assets) did not substantially alter the results below.
15 Due to space limitations, only CR3 is displayed here. However, one-to-five firm concentration ratios were used and all of these yielded the same results when estimated in Equation 1. 18 The original sample consisted of 153 SMSAs. However, due to various data omissions and the requirement that each SMSA have more than three finns, the final sample consists of 124 SMSAs. The following points suggest that there exists little potential for serious sample selection bias. The chosen sample represents a relatively large sample when considered in the context of previous studies of the savings and loan industry. For example, see Marlow (1982) with III SMSAs and Marlow, Link, and Trost (1984) with 99 SMSAs. Moreover, the number of SMSAs with three or fewer finns is only 15 out of the original sample of 153 SMSAs; the other deletions from the sample result from omissions of other data, Finally, running the regressions without the restriction that there must be at least three fmns per SMSA (139 SMSAs) does not generate significant changes in the coefficients and significant levels in any independent variable.Profitability P is measured as net income before taxes/total assets. Static and dynamic measures of market structure (MS s and MS D ) are used to measure the impacts of structure on profitability. Static measures are the three-firm concentration ratio CR3 and the Herfindahl index H. Dynamic measures are changes in the traditional static measures DCR3 and DH and our suggested dynamic measures M and T. Due to data availability, DCR3 and DH are for the period 1977-1979 and M and T are for 1976-1979 . Past studies have expected a positive relation to exist between static measures (CR3 and H) and profitability P.
Past studies have expected positive relations between profitability and changes in static measures DCR3 and DH; however, we argued above that, similar to the problems associated with CR3 and H, these measures may not be expected to have a significant influence on profitability. Mobility M and turnover T should be negatively related to profitability.
Operating expenses OPEX should be negatively related to profitability. Cash and investment securities divided by assets, LIQ is a measure of liquidity and should exert a negative effect on profitability. Demand variables PCYand PP should be positively related to profitability .
The number of commercial banks per capita CBP are controlled because they compete with savings and loans for deposits. 21 To a lesser extent, commercial banks also compete with savings and loans in various loan markets. Because greater numbers of commercial banks per capita should exert stronger competitive forces in markets, a negative relation between CBP and profitability is expected. 22 Dummies Dl (West Coast) and m (East Coast) control regional differences in profitability. These may include age of loan portfolio and differences in income and population growth. For example, faster growth on the West Coast may be reflected in younger loan portfolios for the West Coast with higher yields. In addition, more rapid population and income growth on the West Coast should exert relatively favorable impacts on profitability. For these reasons DI and D2 should carry positive and negative signs, respectively. 23 Table I displays the regression results for equations with static measures of market structure, with and without regional dummies. Operating costs OPEX exert negative and statistically significant impacts ,on profitability for the equations with the regional dummies.
Liquidity LIQ exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on profitability for the equations without the regional dummies. When statistically significant, both OPEX and LIQ exhibit the expected signs. Per capita income PCY never exerts an effect statistically different from zero. For the equations without regional dummies, population growth PP exerts the expected positive and statistically significant impact on profitability. The impact from commercial banks per capita CBP is never statistically different from zero. Both dummies DI and D2 carry expected and statistically significant signs. Inclusion of the dummies cancels the effects of LIQ and PP on profitability and suggests that their effects are captured in regional display an effect statistically different from zero. However, both of our dynamic measures M and T exert the expected negative and statistically significant impacts on profitability for equations with and without the regional dummies. 24 
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Tables 3 and 4 display the regression results for equations which include both static and dynamic measures of market structure, to control for the ability of firms to alter market positions. That is, competition may be affected by the size of market shares of the largest firms. Static measures of structure reflect the traditional hypothesis that they reflect the monopoly power of firms which, in tum, influences the ability of firms to alter market positions and ultimately their profitability. Dynamic measures reflect the recent level of structural change in the market. For reasons of brevity, only those equations including the regional dummies are displayed; however, the results mirror the results displayed in Tables 1  and 2 for equations with and without regional dummies.
In no case do the static measures of structure (CR3 and H) exert an impact on profitability which is statistically different from zero. Neither of the changes in static measures of structure (DCR3 and DH) display statistically significant impacts on profitability. As in Tables 1 and   Table 3 . Regression Results for Equations with Static and Dynamic Market Structure (T-Statistics Are Shown Below Estimated Coefficients) 2, the coefficients on M and T display negative signs which are statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level or better. Therefore, controlling traditional measures of concentration does not appear to influence the effects of mobility and turnover on profitability.
VI. Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research
Our message is that levels and changes in static indicators of concentration may offer misleading measures of market competition. In the savings and loan idustry, it may not matter much if the largest finns have a large market share, as long as there is active competition among them for position and/or there is potential movement in and out of the top three positions.
A policy implication is that traditional static measures of structure in market structure perfonnance studies are apt to be misleading. The implication for the usefulness of recent work in developing full-distribution static indexes also carries the same conclusion. These implications follow from the problems of standardization and interpretation associated with the various static measures of concentration. The empirical findings of this paper support recent theoretical research which argues that challenges to the dominant core of finns from de novo entrants and existing outgroup members is of primary importance to the maintenance of market power. The implication for regulatory analysis is that more research should be directed at studying dynamic structure measures when considering applications for mergers, acquisitions, or de novo entry.
We suggest two possible avenues for future research. One, further development of measures of dynamic structure will aid our understanding of how evolving market processes affect market perfonnance. At best, our measures of dynamic structure are first approxima tions and could be improved by developing full distribution measures which exclude arbitrary numbers of finns considered (e.g., largest five) and are standardized for differing numbers of finns in small markets. Two, research on the relations between static and dynamic measures of structure is needed. Such research could provide more infonnation on the relative usefulness of static and dynamic measures in fonnulating public policy.
